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A REVIEW OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME, THE
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET AND TRADE POLICIES IN NIGERIA:
influence of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) with
the Foreign Exchange Market as its core element. A great many
people have rightly described the SAP as the boldest economic
policy action ever taken by any Government in Nigeria since
Independence because of its radical approach to finding solution
to the country's persistent economic crisis.
However, some protagonists o f the system of controls have
levelled criticisms on the Authorities for unleashing such
"debilitating" economic measures on the economy. Too often
such critici sms although well-meaning do not appear to be wellinformed.
This paper seeks to throw light on the SAP through a detailed
review and appraisal of its policy framework, implementation
and impact on the economy. For purposes of easy exposition,
the paper is divided into four parts. Part I highlights the genesis
of the economic crisis which led to the adoption of the SAP. Part
II focusses on the policy framework while Part III dwells on other
economic policy measures, especially trade policies, adopted
under the SAP. Part IV attempts some analysis of effects of the
policy measures on the economy and presents the paper's
summary and conclusion.

A bstract
The purpose of the paper was to throw more light on the
Structural Adjustment Programme currently under
implementation in Nigeria through a detailed review and appraisal
of its policy framework . This was considered to be desirable in
view of recent public criticisms many of which appeared not to
be well informed. In a more balanced approach, the paper
reviewed the benefits and costs of the P rogramme. Among the
benefits highlighted were the removal of the overvaluation of the
naira exchange rate, the boost to agricultural exports, greater
industrial capacity utilization and the improved international
confidence in the Nigerian economy. Some of the costs of the
programme were the increased inflationary pressures, the credit
squeeze and influx of imported finished goods. The overall
conclusion of the paper was that the SA P has been a worthwhile
policy package in the context of Nigeria's contemporary economic
problems.
Introduction
For some time now, many academic economists, bankers,
industrialists and the general public have expressed opinions on
the way they conceive the economy to be moving under the

PART I T HE GENESIS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
The Oil boom 1973-80
and with the collapse an economic crisis emerged in Nigeria,
although its magnitude and duration could not be ascertained
at the time. The resultant declines in oil export and prices were
reflected in declines in foreign exchange receipts and government
revenue. For example, crude oil exports fell from a daily average
peak of 2.2 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1979 to 1.23 and 1.0
mbd in 1981 and I 982, respectively, and had since remained at
below 1.3 mbd. Crude oil export prices which rose rapidly from
US $20.94 per barrel in 1979 to US $36.95 in 1980 and US $40
in 1981 fell to US $29 in 1983 and to a trough of US $14.85 in
1986. Consequently, foreign exchange receipts which rose from
US $15.7 billion in 1979 to a peak of US $24.9 billion in 1980
fell to $17 .2 billion in 1981, $12.8 billion and $10.1 billion in 1982
and 1983, respectively and collapsed to only $5.2 billion in 1986.
Thus external reserves fell sharply and foreign debts mounted
in the face of rising imports; government deficits widened and
efforts at containing the adverse developments created some other
serious pro blems such as economic depression, rising prices and
unemployment.

The oil boom of the 1970s brought with it fundamental changes
in the Nigerian economy. The first is the heavy dependence of
the economy on crude petroleum export as the main source of
foreign exchange earnings and government revenue. By 1980 the
oil sector which accounted for 22 per cent of the Gross Domestic
product (GDP) provided 80 per cent of government revenue and
over 96 per cent of export earnings. Secondly, the competitiveness
of the agricultural sector in the international market was eroded
by over-valued naira exchange rate, inadequate pricing policies,
rural-urban migration and neglect arising from the so-called oil
syndrome. The share of the agricultural sector in GDP fell rapidly
from 40 per cent in the early 1970s to 20 per cent in 1980. Low
productivity in the agricu ltural sector became so acute that Nigeria
became heavily dependent on imported food and agro-allied
industrial inputs. Thirdly, the structure of policy incentives and
controls encouraged import-oriented production and consumption
pattern with little incentives for non-oil exports. For example,
exporters were compelled to surrender foreign exchange receipts
to Authorised dealers and because of the over-valued naira
exchange rate, the official naira equivalent of the foreign exchange
receipts often fell short of the cost of non-oil exports. Finally,
the public sector, assisted by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotio n
Decree of 1972/74 became the prime mover of the economy
through huge investments of growing oil revenue in social,
physical and economic infrastructure. By 1980 the Government
accounted for about 50 per cent of GDP and over 60 per cent
of modern-sector employment. It had created some 70 noncommercial and 110 commercial federal parastatals together with
a large number at the State level, many of which relied on
government subvention to cover operating losses.

Review of Policy measures 1982-1 986
During the period 1982 to mid-1986, a number of policy
measures, largely demand management in content, were taken.
In April 1982, the Federal Government enacted the Economic
Stabilization Act designed to arrest the deterioration in the balance
of payments position and revamp the economy. The stabilization
measures concentrated on exchange control, import restrictions
as well as measures in monetary and fiscal policies. Efforts were
made in successive years to reduce the public sector deficit through
a reduction of capital and recurrent expenditures and an increase
in revenue. Some government projects were abandoned or
suspended and emphasis of government shifted to maintenance
and rehabilitation projects, especially in the social and health

The collapse of the world oil market 1981-86
From about mid-1981 the world oil market started to collapse
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services. Government workers were laid off through efforts at
st reamlining public sec!Or employment 10 reduce the burden of
the wage bill. Similarly, existing exchange control measures were
reinforced and made increasingly more stringent. From I 984, all
imports were placed under specific import licencing.
In Ocwber 1985, government declared a fifteen-month
Economic Emergency period during which specified proportions
of workers' salaries and companies' profits were compulsorily
paid to government. On January I , I 986, about 80 per cent o f
the subsidy on petroleum products computed based o n the
prevailing exchange rate was removed and consumers made to
pay more for them. Several initiatives were also embarked upon
from 1983 IO negotiate with overseas creditors on the rescheduling
and re-financing of trade arrears.
The various austerity measures drastically reduced supply of
raw materials and spare parts to the import-dependent industrial

sector , leading to extensive p lant closure, substantial drop in
capacity utilisation a nd retrenchment of many workers. Severe
market shortages led to very high prices of many essential
commodities. Investments, both by the public and private secwrs
shrank and the depression deepened. Thus by end-1985, real per
capita GDP and consumption were well below the levels recorded
in the early 1970s. External debt service obligations increased to
32 per cent of exports. The external debt outstanding rose IO over
US$ I8 billion out of which about $5 billion represented trade
arreai"s. It became obvious that the va rious measures, especially
the restrictive exchange and trade control, taken since 1982 were
mere palliatives as their effectiveness at solving the fundamental
and financial problems of the economy was constrained by the
continued fall in foreign exchange earnings, the over-valuation
of the naira exchange rate and other distortions a nd rigidities in
the economy.

PART II THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (JULY 1986-JUNE 1988)
The serious economic problems facing the Nigerian economy
at the close of 1985 led to the adoption of a programme o f far reaching economic consequences in the 1986 budget. During the
second half of the year, the programme was revised in close
colla boration with the IMF and the World Bank in!O a more
comprehensive Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The
aim of the SAP is to effectively alter and restructure the
consumption and production patterns of the economy, as well
as eliminate price distortions and heavy dependence on the export
of crude oil and imports of consumer and producer goods.
Specifically, the major objectives of the programme are to:

expected to eliminate the distortions in all the major sectors of
the economy, reduce imports, stimulate exports, encourage
efficient import substitution, encourage capital inflow and pave
the way to a more self-reliant and sustainable growth.
The operational fr amework of the SFEM (now FEM) is the
Closed Auction System, whereby the Central Bank calls for bids
from all authorised foreign exchange dealers o nce a week, now
once a fortnight, for available foreign exchange. Within the limit
set for each authorised dealer, available foreign exchange is sold
to successful bidders for on the counter sale to their cus!Omers
at a price determined at the bidding sessions plus a one per cent
margin fixed by the Central Bank of Nigeria. Interbank
transactions are also permitted. With the exception of transactions
related to government foreign debt, co ntributions to international
organisations and trar.sfers to Nigeria's Missions abroad, which
were carried out at the official first-tier rate, all transactions are
through the SFEM. The first-tier rate was expected to move in
sympathy and eventually merge with the SFEM rate within a
period of nine months.

(a) restructure and diversify the productive base o f the
economy in order IO reduce dependence on the oil sector
and on imports;
(b) achieve fi scal and balance of payments viability over the
period;
(c) lay the basis for a sustainable non-inflationary or minimal
inflationary growth;
(d) lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the
public sector, improve the sector's efficiency and intensify
the growth potential of the private sec!Or.

However, some experimentation was resorted to in determining
the SFEM rate. Initially, the" Average of Successful Bid Rates"
was used as the basis for determining naira exchange rate. When
it was realised that the above pricing arrangement was
inappropriate as a basis for determining a realistic exchange rate,
the "marginal rate" was introduced as the basis on 9th October,
1986. Agai n , following the recognition that the marginal rate
pricing arrangement did not work satisfac!Orily in terms o f
ensuring fair competition and professionalism in bidding, the
Dutch Auction pricing system was adopted, effective 2nd April,
1987. Soon, bi-monthly bidding session was adopted. In line with
the expectation of a merger of the first-tier rate and the SFEM
rate, the two rates were actually merged on 2nd July, 1987 and
what we now have is a single Foreign Exchange Market (FEM).

The main st rategy of the adjustment programme includes:
(a) the adoption of a realistic exchange rate policy coupled
with the liberalisation of the external trade and payments
system;
(b) adoption of appropriate pricing policies in all sectors wit h
a greater reliance on market forces and reduct io n in
complex administrative controls;
(c) further rationalisation and restructuring of public
expenditures and custom tariffs .
The Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SEFEM)
The Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) which
constitutes an important aspect of Nigeria's structural adjustment
programme commenced on the 29th September , 1986. The
objective of the S FEM is to evolve a realistic and marketdetermined exchange rate for the naira, so as to reduce demand
for foreign exchange to available supply and to reduce the pressure
on the balance of payments. Such a realistic exchange rate is

The FEM remains a free market fo r the sale or purchase of
foreign exchange based on rates determined by market forces of
suppl y and demand. However, there is scope for the Monetary
Authorities to intervene in the market to ensure its orderliness
and stability as well as to exercise supervision and moniwring
functions over its operation. The structure also remains the same
as that of the SFEM, a nd bidding sessions continue as a
mec hanism for channelling official funds into the market. The
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SFEM guidelines on eligible transactions, documentation
requirements, processing of applications, submission of returns
and sanctions apply to the FEM.
The major source of supply of foreign exchange to SFEM/ FEM
is expected to be the Central Bank of Nigeria, augmented over
time with flows from autonomous sources such as foreign
currency domiciliary accounts, and capital inflows from corporate

and non-corporate bodies. The World Bank provided a loan of
US $452 million for funding the SFEM, in 1986. As at June 1987,
this was fully drawn down. Also part of the foreign exchange
in the Escrow accounts from the countertrade deals have been
used to finance the market. The African Development Bank
(ADB) has also been contacted for a loan of $300 million much
of which is expected to be used in funding the SFEM.

PART III OTHER ECONOMIC POLICY MEASURES ADOPTED UNDER THE SAP
deposit in non-interest bearing deposit account at the CBN the
naira counterpart of all outstanding external payments arrears.
About N4.2 billion was lodged with the Bank at the end of the
exercise. Also, in line with the objectives of the SAP and the
introduction of the SFEM, the following monetary policy
measures were adopted:

(a) C urre nt Trade Policies

An important aspect of the introduction of the SFEM is trade
liberalisation. This is reflected in the immediate abolition of
import and export licensing and exchange control on all current
transactions and the reduction of prohibited import items from
74 to only 16. Similarly, the previous requirement that Nigerian
residents should surrender their foreign exchange earnings to the
Central Bank of Nigeria was abolished. Henceforth, exporters
and other foreign exchange earners are entitled to 100 per cent
of their foreign exchange earnings which they must repatriate and
keep in their domiciliary account on which they can freely draw
to meet all eligible foreign exchange transactions under the SFEM.
Also, the Central Bank delegated to the authorised dealers full
approving authority for current private sector current account
transactions. As for Capital account transactions, the Federal
Ministry of Finance continued to be the approving authority.
With the introduction of SFEM, the 30 per cent import levy
introduced in January 1986 was abolished as superfluous. In
recognition of the need to improve the financial liquidity of
companies for trade and other purposes, a system of advance
payment of import duties whereby importers were required to
pay the appropriate import duty at the time letters of credit are
opened, was revised. Under the revised system, only 25 per cent
of the assessed import duty need be paid, effective January I ,
1987. The balance of 75 per cent was to be paid when the goods
actually arrive. A related trade policy measure announced in the
January 1987 budget and designed to promote exports is the duty
draw-back/ suspension. Under the scheme, exporters/ producers
could import raw materials and intermediate products for use
in the manufacture of export products free of import duty and
other indirect taxes and charges. The scheme also covered exports
made on Letters of Credit as well as those made on sight or
usuance.

(a) The 1986 ceiling of 10 per cent imposed on the rate of
credit expansion by the big and medium-sized commercial
banks was reduced to 8.0 per cent for the rest of 1986
and the whole of 1987;
(b) The 9½ per cent interest rates payable on savings deposit
was retained. However, in the place of the range of 8 ½
to 12 per cent interest payable on time deposits of varying
maturities, a floor of 8 ½ per cent was fixed. The ceiling
of bank lending rates was raised from 13 to 15 per cent.
Other lending rates were to adjust upwards accordingly.
However, the banks and their customers were given the
freedom to negotiate deposit and lending rates within the
stipulated range which might vary from bank to bank and
according to the size and maturity of deposits or loan as
well as the forces of supply of, and demand for, funds;
(c) Additional measures were adopted with effect from
1st August, 1987;
(i) The 8 per cent ceiling on commercial bank credit
expansion was revised to 7.4 per cent for the last
three quarters of the year. Banks which exceed the
permissible rate of credit expansion shall be required
to deposit an amount equivalent to the excess credit
with the Central Bank of Nigeria free of interest;
(ii) All controls on interest rates were removed in line
with the emphasis on the deregulation of the
economy in the SAP;
(iii) In order to encourage the private sector non-bank
public to invest in government securities, the treasury
bill rate was raised from 10 to 14 per cent and the
minimum rediscount rate was fixed at 15 per cent;
(iv) The minimum liquidity ratio for commercial banks
was raised from 25 to 30 per cent.

(b) Fiscal Measures

Some of the existing fiscal policy measures were reviewed and
rationalised in line with the structural adjustment programme,
with a view to ameliorating the expected inflationary impact of
SFEM. Besides the abolition of the 30 per cent import levy and
the reduction of import prohibition list from 74 to 16, import
and excise duties were substantially reduced pending the results
of studies comm issioned for their further review and
rationalisation in keeping with the regime of flexibile exchange
rates. Also, the deduction from workers' salaries under the
national economic recovery fund was discontinued and deductions
already made from workers with annual salaries not exceeding
N3,600 was refunded to them.

Financing the Adjustment Programme

A review of the SAP and the specific organs and measures
adopted under it would be incomplete if something is not said
about how the government plans to finance the adjustment
programme. This sectio n briefly outlines the financing
arrangement.
Government expects substantial public and private sector
savings mobilisation to finance the programme. The expectation
was based on the planned reform of the parastatals and the
financial system. Also, government seeks to finance the
programme through measures designed to control public
expenditures and reduce import demand. Through the adoption

(c) Mo netary Po licy measu res
In order to reduce the ability of the commercial banks to grant

credit for trading on the SFEM, the Central Bank of Nigeria
required the commercial banks on the 15th August, I 986, to
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of more realistic exchange rate and deregulation of interest rates,
government expects a considerable a m ount of capital in flow. Of
importance in the finan cing plan is debt rescheduling.
In order to reduce the debt service burden, continuous
negotiations had been going on with the overseas creditors to
reschedule the countr y's foreign d ebt, that is, to re-arrange debt
maturities with new repayment schedule and grace period. The
negotiations with t he London Club - the private creditors
(banks) - had commenced during the second quarter o f 1986
while those with the official creditors in the Paris Club began
in December 1986. Agreement was reached with the Steering
Committee of the member banks of the London C lub to

reschedule repayments on medium and long-term debts owed
them for nine years with a four-year grace period, with interest
of 1 ¼ per cent above LIBOR and a restructuring fee of ½ per
cent on total rescheduled amount.
Existing arrangements to refinance uninsured trade debts
through the issuance of promissory notes and the rescheduling
of payments have also progressed satisfactorily. The estimated
short-term trade debt in respect of bills maturing up to 31st
Decem ber, 1986 is of the order of $7 .0 billion. P romissory notes
already issued to uninsured creditors stand at about £3 .2 billion.
However, claims worth about £800 million have been verified and
accepted for insured creditors.

P ART IV THE EFFECTS OF T HE SAP ON T HE ECONOMY
The Structural Adjustment Programme has been in operation
for a little over one year. H owever, since most of the objectives
and measures of the programme need m edium to long-term
gestation periods to fructify, it is perhaps too early to attempt
a full assessment. Even so, some preliminary a ppraisal is still in
ord er if o nly to give a fair indicatio n of developments in t he
economy since the introduction of t he SAP.
It may be convenient to begin the appraisal of the SAP by
highlighting developments in the naira excha nge rate - perhaps
the most important relative price in the economy, which influences
movements in most macro-economic variables. Developments in
the SFEM/ FEM do indicate that a real istic market-determined
naira exchange rate is emerg ing.
In the first week o f operation of the SFEM, the naira exchange
rate stood at N4.6 l 74 to $ 1.0000; compared with the first-tier
rate of NI .573 1 to $1.0000 as at 26th September, 1986, the rate
reflected a depreciation of about 66 per cent. Although there have
been fluctuatio ns in the exchange rate through the various bidding
sessions , there has been remarkable narrowing of the d ifference
between the highest and the lowest bid rates. The median exchange
rate during the review period, that is , 26th September, 1986,
through 18th June, 1987, was about N4.00 to the US $ 1.00.
W ith the operation of SFEM and the subsequent substant ial
depreciation of the naira exchange rate, t he wide margins between
the parallel an d the official exchange rates narrowed down. This
was reflected in the decline in the immediate pre-SFEM parallel
market premium, de fined as the ratio of t he parallel market rate
and the official exchange rate . The premium declined
monotonically from 238 per cent in 1986 to about 12 per cent
in July, 1987. Among other things, the current low premium
reflects t he fact that much of the over-valuation of the naira
exchange rate has been s uccessfully eliminated through the SFEM
and the naira is now much closer to its realistic exchange rate
than was the case in the immediate pre-SFEM period.
Besides resolvi ng the problem of over-valuation, the
implement ation of the SAP through the SFEM has enhanced
administrative a nd allo cative efficiency o f government as access
to fo reign exc hange by industries and other users is now much
easier compared with the regime of foreig n exchange rationing
through import licence and pervasive intervent ion in the financial
market (see Table 5). The financial market has been s ubst antially
de-regulated, especially since August 1, 1987. Thi s has, a mong
othe r things, engendered competitio n amo ng ban ks for d eposits,
savings mobilisation, reduced capital night and to some extent
boosted capital inflow.

There were indications that capacity utilisation has been
enhanced in a number of industr ies, especially t hose that are less
dependent o n imported inputs. The results of a Central Bank of
Nigeria count ry-wide s urvey of ma nufacturing firms in Nigeria
indicate that industrial enterprises such as paper manufacturing,
beer brewing, textiles, vegetable oil, paints and cement recorded
significant increases in capacity utilisation, averaging 51.7, 41.5m
60.4, 42.5, 59.8 and 84.7 per cent, respectively during t he first
quarter of 1987 compared with 41.8, 39.5, 46.4, 26.9, 45.3 and
70.7 per cent , respectively in the corresponding period of 1986.
T he survey, however, reported declines in capacity utilisation
in industries which were heavily dependent on imports. In those
industries including motor vehicle assem bly, carpets/ rugs, and
electronic equipment manufacture, capacity utilisation declined
to 7 .0, 15.0 and 18.5 per cent; respectively in the first quarte r
of 1987 compared with the levels of 16.2, 45.0 and 24.5 per cent
recorded in t he corresponding period of 1986. A significant
development in t he manufacturing sector was the steady growth
in the volume o f locally sourced raw materials in such industries
as meat and meat products, beer and stout, textiles, plastic
products, paints and structural metal products.
A major effect of the SAP has been the boost to non-oil exports
as a result of the a lteration of relative prices via exchange rate
adjustment, which has made our exports more competitive, as
well as the various export incentive schemes including 100 per
cent retention of proceeds accorded non-oil exporters. The output
of agricu lt ura l export crops, especially cocoa, cotton , rubber,
groundnut, palm produce, ginger and coffee was stimulated and
actively trad ed as a result of the sharp increase in farmgate prices
of these cash c rops following the substan tial depreciation of the
naira exchange rate with the introduction o f the SFEM . In some
cases, s uch as rubber and cocoa, abandoned trees are being
rehabilitated. T he table below is indicative:
A utono mous (no n-oil) Inflow of Foreign Excha nge
($ mil.)

Category
Non-oil exports
plus others net
of domiciliary
account
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1984

1985

1986
(Oct.-Dec.)

1987
(Jan.-May)

322 .7

392.0

227 .6

478.4

namely, the SFEM/ FEM and the accompanying trade, fiscal and
monetary measures. Performance appraisal of the SAP was
reviewed and some interesting results emerged.
Of great importance has been the successful elimination of overvaluation of the naira exchange rate - an over-valuation that
imparted far-reaching distortions into the economic system. The
naira excha nge rate at about l>/4.00 to the US $1.00 is now much
closer to its realistic level than was the case in the immediate preSFEM period. The elimination of over-valuation is reflected in
the current low level of the parallel market premium.
With the SFEM achieving naira exchange rates which largely
reflect the forces of supply and demand for foreign exchange,
the implementation of the SAP has en hanced administrative and
allocative efficiency of government. In most industries that are
less dependent on imported inputs, such as paper manufacturing,
beer brewing, textiles, paints, cement and vegetable oil, significant
increases were recorded in capacity utilisation during the first
quarter of 1987 compared with the position in the cor responding
period of 1986. A significant development in the manufacturing
sector was the steady growth in the volume of locally sourced
raw materials, especially meat and meat products, beer and stout,
textiles, paints, etc. Also, the SAP has induced a boost in nonoil exports as a result of the alteration of relative prices via
exchange rate adjustment. International confidence in the
Nigerian economy is gradually improving with the operation of
the Structural Adjustment Progra mme.
Although some adverse side effects have been associated with
the operation of SAP, such as increased in flationary pressures,
credit squeeze and influx of imported finished goods, the net gains
to the economy have been tremendous. It is thus little wonder
that many have du bbed the SAP as the most desirable policy
option at this critical moment in the nation's economic
circumstances.

On the external sector , there has been a gradual return of the
country to creditworthiness. The SAP has provided a favourable
environment for debt rescheduling and negotiating refinancing
arrangements. Thus far, Nigeria has signed bilateral agreements
with the United Kingdom, France, the Republic of Austria and
the Swiss Confederation The rescheduling effort brought the debt
service ratio from 42 per cent in 1986 to 24 per cent in 1987. Thus
rescheduling has enabled the country to devote more foreign
exchange earnings towards meeting the needs of the more pressing
and growth-oriented sectors.
An analysis of the effects of SAP o n the economy would be
incomplete if it is silent on the adverse side effects. Among these
effects include the inflat ionary pressure generated by the high
cost of foreign exchange. Fortunately, the inflationary pressures
turned out to be a good deal less than was expected, being
seriously mitigated by the effective demand management policies
adopted by Government and the welcome emergence of
"consumer resistance" to prohibitive prices.
Although the observed average liq uidity ratio in the banking
system is over 50 per cent compared with the statutory minimum
liquidity ratio of 25 per cent now raised to 30 per cent under the
monetary policy circular amendment, effective August I, 1987,
the business community continues to harp on the issue of credit
squeeze. The squeeze had in fact been felt by the small and
medium scale industries. However, it should be recognised that
the current tight monetary policy is being pursued as a
stabilisation measure and that any undue liberalisation of credit
would generate serious inflationary pressures, and pressures on
the balance of payments especially in the present circumstances
of a fragile external reserve position. The other negative side effect
has been the influx of imported fin ished goods following the
reduction of average trade-weighted tariff rate from 35 to 25 per
cent (see Table 5). This modified tariff structure has worsened
the problems of protection for local industries and is in need of
urgent review.

S. E. Omoruyi
Chief Research Officer
Central Bank of N igeria
Lagos

Summary and Conclusio n
This paper has discussed the perverse economic situation that
led to the adoption of the Structural Adjustment P rogram me.
It has also outlined the major strands of policy under the SAP ,

November 1987.
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APPENDIX I
List o f eligible transactions under SFEM
I. Visible Private Sector Imports (Except Imports under
Absolute Prohibition)
2. Visible Public Sector Imports (Except Imports under
Absolute Prohibition)
(i) Educational Expenses - Student Tuition and
Maintenance
(ii) Expatriate Personal H orne Remittances
Monthly Remittance
Gratuity
Leave Pay
Final Balance
Bonus
(iii) Re-insurance
(iv) P ersonal Insurance
(v) Net P roceeds of International Air Ticket sales
(vi) Aircraft Lease Fees
(vii) C harter fees for bunkering and Fishing Vessels
(viii) Repairs and Maintenance of shipping vessels and
aircraft
(ix) Travel
Basic Travel Allowance (BTA)
- Business Travel

(x)
(xi)
(xii)

(xiii)
(xiv)
(xv)

(xvi)
(xvii)
(xviii)
(xiv)
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- Medical Tours
- Pilgrimage
Conferences and Seminars
In-service Training
Contract Service Fees
- Management Services
- Service charges for work done in Nigeria by
highly skilled expatriate personnel
- Consultancy fees
- Directors' fees
Membersh ip Subscriptions and Examination Fees
Single copies of books for personal use
Miscellaneous
- Judgment Debt
- Commissions and Brokerages
- Copyright Patent and Royalties
- Advertisement outside Nigeria
- Others
Correspondence Course
F reight of Personal Effects fo r Returning Students
Investment Income
Pre-paid Travel Advice (for the guidance of airlines only)

Table I

SCHEDULE OF EXCHANGE RATE DEVELOPMENTS IN SFEM (26th SEPTEMBER, 1986 TO 30th JUNE 1987)

REMARKS
Session

Date

Amount
(Supply)
$

Lowest Bid
Ra te

SFE M Rate

First-Tier

$
84.37m
99. ll m
75.525m
93.55m
88.00111
90.55m
69.25m
76.65m
8 1.34m
79.68m
60.862m
75.295m
52.235m
55.41m
6 1. 59m
64.60m
64. IOm
94.04m
74.97m
66.96m
63.40m
38.39m
46.40m
65.80m
102. 18m
95.96m
100.70m

N
5.1 250
5.5999
5.3499
4.8000
4.4999
4.0000
4.3640
4.2013
3.9995
3.8750
3.6065
3.5021
3.6500
4.0000
3.9876
4.2565
4.3977
4.3 116
4.3213
4.2220
4.3000
4.2755
4.2000
4.2500
4.0604
4.0205
4. 1501

N
2.5000
3.0000
2.7050
3.3450
3.7500
3.7001
3.6000
3.4993
3.3 125
3.4462
3.0005
2.9900
3.2000
3.3825
3.4950
3.6000
3.7895
3.6852
3.5000
3.5000
3.5000
3.8050
3.8999
3.6500
3.5250
3.7500
3.9499

N
4.6174
5.0585
3.4999
3.9101
4.1 775
3.8525
3.6000
3.4993
3.4599
3.4945
3.0005
3.2000
3.3000
3.4422
3.5547
3.7002
3.89 14
3.94 12
3.0000
3.9246
3.9242
3.824 1
3.9 195
4.0203
3.7001
3.8990
3.9999

N
1.5691
1.617 1
1.7004
1.8064
1.9384
2.0387
2.1441
2.2548
2.3469
2.4679
2.5954
2.5954
2.5954
2.5954
2.5954
2.5954
2.6752
2.8129
2.9577
2.9577
3.0479
3.1407
3.205 1
3.3036

No. of
Successful Banks
16
13
36
33
34
39
30
36
35
35
35
29
37
34
32
32
36
34
42
33
36
27
29
32
34
33
35

I Unsuccessful
No. of
Banks
18
25
02
06
06
02
09
NIL
03
02
NIL
10
02
05
08
10
06
09
NIL
II
08
NIL
NIL
10
10
11
II

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
2 1.
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

26/9/86
2/ 10/86
9/ 10/86
16/ 10/86
23/10/86
30/10/ 86
6/1 1/ 86
13/11/86
20/ 11 /86
27/ 11 /86
4/ 12/ 86
11 / 12/86
18/12/86
8/1/87
15/ 1/ 87
22/ 1/ 87
29/1/87
5/2/87
12/2/87
19/2/ 87
26/2/87
5/ 3/87
12/ 3/ 87
19/ 3/ 87
2/4/87
16/4/87
30/ 4/ 87

28.

14/ 5/ 87

85m

120.70m

4.2502

4.0207

4.1 617

3.5088

32

14

29.

4/6/87

100m

150.00m

4.6599

4.6000

4.3637

3.5088

33

15

30.

18/ 6/ 87

70m

64.39m

4.2 140

3.7001

3.7375

3.6887

30

NIL

TOTAL

$1,999.00m

$2,355.93m

I.

w
u,

50m
50m
75m
80m
75m
86m
75m
75m
75 m
75 m
75m
75m
50m
50m
50m
50m
55m
75m
75m
50m
53m
50m
50m
50m
80m
70m
70m

Highest Bid
Rate

Demand

Table 2

AUTHORISED DEALERS SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE (OCTOBER 1986 TO JUN E 1987)

1986
October

w

°'

1986
1986
November December

1987
January

1987
February

1987
March

1987
April

1987
May

1987
June

Cumulative up to
June 1987 (SM)

I. C. B.N. Auction ........ ... . .......

371.83

330.54

237 .99

209.93

268.59

142.67

197.69

113.94

152.50

2,025.68

72.27 '1/o

2. Inflows (autonomo us sources 10
banks) ............. ..... .... . ....
(a) Non-oil Exports ..... ..........
(i) Out-righ t purchase .. . . .........
(ii) Lodge in Domiciliary A ccoun ts ..
(b) Invisibles Services . .. . . ...... .. .
(c) Others .. .. ..... . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .

49.84
7.93
2.82
5. 11
17.65
24.26

75. 16
14.59
9.84
4 .75
16.5 1
44.06

102.57
24.60
10.13
14.47
28.99
48.98

102.44
40.24
15.65
24.59
36.74
23.46

130.64
48.38
11.66
36.72
27 .72
54.52

106.80
40.33
26.03
14.30
20.48
45.98

81.70
30.26
15.05
15.21
13.28
38. 16

56.84
27.39
17. 16
10.24
10.88
18.57

7 1.59
36.01
16.24
19.78
8. 12
27.45

777.56
269.75
124.58
145.17
180.38
325.46

27.730/o

3. Domiciliary Accounts .... .. ........
(a) Opening balance for the month
under review .......... ... .... .
(b) C losing balance for the month
under review ................. .
(c) Net Change in Do miciliary
Accounts for I he mo nth under
review .... . .... .. . . .. .........
To tal sources n et o f
increase/ decrease on Domiciliary
Accounts ( I & 2) ................ ..

-

-

-

-

54. 8 1

6 1.26

64.23

73 .32

6 1.46

-

-

-

-

50.75

57.33

74.48

68.86

68.09

7.5 1

2.59

- 4.06

- 3.93

+ 10.25

- 4.46

+6.63

42 1.67

405.70

340.56
3 12.37
249.47
399.23
Source: Cent ral Bank of Nigeria

279.39

170.78

224.09

22.49

8.84

2,803.26

l00%

SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE UNDER SFEM FOR THE MONTHS OF MAY AND JUNE 1987
AND CUMULATIVE OCTOBER 1986 TO JUNE 1987

w

-..J

C umulative figure in I 0/o of Total
US $ for up to J une 1987

Total figure in US $
for May 1987

OJo of Total

Total figure in US $
for June 1987

A. Imports ..........................

155,300,672 .60

9 1.86

174,854,718.69

91.39

1,8 10,893,567.59

92.35

Industrial Sector .................
(i) Raw M aterials .... ....... . ...
(ii) Machinery, Spare Parts and
CKD .......
...........

99,381,857.20
53 ,292,940.78

58.78
31.52

121,767,992.22
58,928, 183.45

63.64
30.00

1,295,787,457.65
737,593,863.49

66.08
37.8 1

46,088,916.42

27.26

62,839,808.77

32.84

558,193,594.1 6

28.46

Agricultural Sector ....... .. . ...... . ..

426,081.53

0.25

753,087.70

0.39

8,903,223.44

0.45

Finished Goods ................ . .. . ..
(i) Food .......................
(ii) General Merchandise ...... . ..
(a) Drugs & Pharmaceuticals ..
(b) Books & Educational
Materials ................
(c) Other General Merchandise
(iii) Capital Goods - Aircraft
Shipping ................. ...

55,492,733.87
25,894,356.06
28,769,488.69
6,861,466.61

32.82
15.32
17.02
4.06

52,333,638.77
10,538,249.94
41,516,425.83
16,030,991.48

27.35
5.50
2 1.69
8.37

506,202,886.50
140,927,130.82
354,492,251.79
79,381,431.35

25.81
7. 19
18.08
4.05

1,251, 149.03
20,656,873.03

0.74
12.22

783,719.07
24,701,715 .28

0.40
12.91

13,99 1,492.31
261,119,324 .13

0.7 1
13.32

828,889. 12

0.49

278,963.00

0. 14

10,783,503,89

0.55

B. Invisibles ............... . . .. .....
(i) Education ... ..... ........ .
(ii) Personal Home Remittance ....
(iii) Airline Remittances ........ ...
(iv) Travel ............... . .. . ...
(v) Re-Insura nce . ........ ... . . ..
(vi) Contract ............. ...... .
(vii) Aircrafl lease Maintenance Fees
(viii) Shipping Vessels Charter &
M aintena nee .................
(ix) Investment I ncome Prof it &
Dividend . ... .........
(x) O thers .................. . . . .

13,770,597.30
522,7 11.85
2,553,144.38
2,484,698.89
1,232,183.00
88,886.6 1
I, 126, 17 1.29
21,778.59

8. 15
0.3 1
1.51
1.47
0.73
0.05
0.67
0.01

16,470,499.52
1, 171 ,69 1.87
1,602,533.05
3,939,35 1. 15
2,561,397.69
83,832.87
554,285.06
119,5 18 .59

8.59
0.61
0.84
2 .06
1.34
0.04
0.29
0.06

149,875,072 .30
6,095,222.35
13,923,884.15
42,493,861.64
11 ,056,390.4 1
2,040,394.05
5,244,433.46
1,480,010.2 1

7.64
0.3 1
0.71
2.17
0.56

300,000.00

0.18

2,208,902 .90

1.1 5

5,696,418 .08

0.29

1,556,658.16
3,884,364.53

0.92
2 .30

2, 139,943.40
2,089,042.74

1.12
1.09

17,8 18,012.95
44,026,045.00

0.91
2.25

+ B) ..... ............ .. .

169,071,269 .90

I00OJo

19 1,325,218.21

1000/o

1,960,768,639.89

1000/o

TOTAL (A

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

0/o of Total

Table 3

0.IO
0.27
0 .08

SECTORAL ANA LYSIS OF NON-OIL EX PORTS FROM 1st OCTOBER TO 30th JUNE 1987

Table 4

Items

Value of Goods
Exported ($)

P roceeds due up
to 30th June 1987 ($)

Total Proceeds
repatriated as at
30th June 1987

I.

Agricultural Products . . . . .. . .. . .. .
Cocoa..... ........
. . ... ...... . . •
Cocoa P roducts ... ...... . ... . .. .... .
Palm Produce .. .. . . .... ... .. . . ..... .
Rubber .. .. . . ....... • • •. .. . .... . . ...
Wood P roducts .... ... .. . .... .. .
Fish and Shrimps ...... .... .... .. .
Hides and Skin .. ... . . .. .. .. ....... . .
Co ffee .. ... . ..... ... .. . . ....... . . . . .
Ginger .... . ...... . . . ... . ..... .... .. .
Gum Arabic .. . ........ . .. .... . .
O ther Agric P roducts ............ ... .

420,623,870
324,093,370
30 ,7 19,639
25,699,584
12,508,049
12, 167,5 13
2,533,102
1, 112,792
2,520,966
287 ,760
5,154,401
3,826,694

368,716,703
287,695,929
26,276,728
22,060,433
10,047,354
10,712,510
1,891,350
859,972
1,934,87 1
185,427
3,762,645
3,289,484

201,867,414
148,720,902
19,326,015
10,474,654
7,792,068
8,097,969
1,381,272
587,5 18
1,090,765
62,962
2,353,644
1,979,645

2.

Minerals . .. .. .. .... . . . . . . ......... . .
T in .. . .... ......... . . . ..... ... ... .. .
O ther Minerals .. .... . .. . ........ . .. .

3,227,820
2,763,524
464,296

2,500,264
2,120,844
379,420

1,298,222
1,199,253
98,969

3.

Manufactured Goods . . . . . . . . ... . . .
Beer ...... ........ . ..... .. . . . . •••
Soa p and Detergents .. . . . . .. .. ....
Textiles . . . . ........ . . ... . . . . . ....
Plastics ..... . . .......... ...... . . .
Others ..... .. . ........ ...... .....

.. .
.. .
.. .
...
.. .
.. .

6,067,782
260,130

4,780,620
46,582

3,097,785
10,450

2,748,190
50,088
3,009,374

1,836,466
50,088
2,847,484

1,571 ,373

Others . ..... . . .......... ....... .. . . .
Scra p Ma terials . ... . .. .. .. . . . . . ..... .
Craft-Ra fia Baskets .. . ... ..... . . . . .. .
Others . .... . . ............ ......... . .

2,290,519
464 ,750
5,000
1,820,769

1,368,528
377,250
5,000
986,278

975,525

432,209,991

377,366, 115

207,238,946

No.

4.

1,5 15,962

975,525

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria

Table 5

SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE
%

1986
(October-Decem ber)'

1987
(January-May) '

1984'

1985'

58

60
(42)
( 18)

78
(48)
(30)

57
(30)
(27)

2. Finished Goods . . . . . . . .
Food . . ... . ...... ... . ... .....
G eneral Merchandise . . . . . . . . . .

30
(18)
( 12)

20
(8)
( 12)

19.0
(4. 7)
( 14.3)

31
(10)
(2 1)

3. Invisibles, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

20

2.7

12

Sectors
1. Industrial ........ ....... . .

Raw Materials . ...... .. ..... .
Spare Parts . ... . ...... . . . . .. .

Sources:
' C BN Annual Report, various years
' SAP Mon ito ring Committee
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